model should be examined closely and may need revision. This article argues that the existing model handles this apparent anomaly remarkably well, explaining Clinton's approval ratings just as well as it explained presidents' approval in the previous 40 years.
The oddities of Clinton's approval have been well documented: while approval models suggest that the public punishes presidents for scandals, he remained popular after several scandals and his approval ratings actually increased during the Lewinsky investigation and impeachment proceedings. These events raise the possibility that the public considered the scandal irrelevant to Clinton's performance in office, separating its opinion of his personal integrity from its opinion of his job performance. This view has become quite prevalent, both within popular discourse about the affair and among many political scientists' initial assessments of Clinton's popularity (e.g., Campbell and Rockman 2000; Edwards 2000; Jacobson 1999; Miroff 2000) . If true, the existing model does not account for Clinton's approval ratings and must be changed.
This article examines whether explaining Clinton's approval ratings requires a different model by comparing the structure of his approval ratings to the structure of previous presidents' approval ratings. The study has four sections. The first reviews the basic model of approval and presents the Clinton presidency's challenge to the model. The second tests the existing model against Clinton's approval ratings. The third takes a closer look at the model's explanation of Clinton's approval, highlighting the effects of the economy and the Lewinsky scandal. The fourth draws some conclusions about the existing model and the nature of the connection between presidents and the public.
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL AND PRESIDENT CLINTON
Presidential approval ratings are the most frequently measured and best known political "fact" in the current American political environment (Ragsdale 1998) , the "Dow Jones Index for Politics" (Brehm 1993: 6) . Many consider these ratings a form of political capital and argue that the ratings affect various aspects of presidential strategies and political outcomes, including the president's legislative agenda, strategy, and success (e.g., Brace and Hinckley 1992; Kernell 1997; Rivers and Rose 1985) and his party's electoral success (Brody and Sigelman 1983; Newman and Ostrom 2002; Sigelman 1979;  Simon, Ostrom, and Marra 1991) . Although some dispute these claims (e.g., Edwards 1989) , presidential approval ratings occupy a central place in discussions of American politics in the media, among political elites (e.g., Morris 1997; Woodward 1996) , and among political scientists (e.g., Brace and Hinckley 1992; Brody 1991; Clarke and Stewart 1994; Hibbs 1987; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992, 1996; Mueller, 1973; Nadeau et al. 1999; Norpoth 1996; Simon 1985, 1988 ).
The Existing Model
The vast body of scholarly study of approval ratings has largely concluded that the public expects the president to provide peace, prosperity, and probity, and the public's approval depends on the extent to which the president meets these expectations. Many argue that these expectations apply to all presidents. For example, Brace and Hinckley (1992: 13) contend that "if we ask what the stylish Kennedy, the genial general, the born-again Christian, the log-rolling Texan, and the professional actor have in common, the answer is a set of expectations." In addition, the public's approval often rises in response to an important event in which the president played a significant role, like major diplomatic breakthroughs or the deployment of military force, so-called "rally-round-theflag events" (Mueller 1973) . These events focus the public's attention on the president, put him in positions in which he can "look presidential," exert power to a degree normally not possible, and provide a period during which many of his usual opponents withhold their criticism (Brody 1991 Andolina and Wilcox (2000: 189) argued that "many Americans compartmentalized their judgments about the moral conduct, allowing condemnation of the behavior while supporting the president's policies" and Jacobson (1999: 46) suggested that Clinton's approval remained high because "most people maintain[ed] a sharp public/private distinction." Further, Lawrence and Bennett (2001: 432) pointed out the prevalence of this claim, arguing that "the common logic behind this public/private distinction appeared time and again." Most importantly for the purposes of this paper, Edwards (2000: 42) claimed that the public's apparent dismissal of the president's personal integrity (Edwards 1996) , advertising (Schier 2000; Woodward 1996: 344) , and public appearances (Ragsdale 1998: 175-76, 179) . Thus, Schier (2000: 15) con--tended that Clinton was able "through careful assessment of public opinion and shrewd campaigning while in office, to create public approval" (emphasis mine). Similarly, Miroff (2000: 121) argued that Clinton's "courtship of the public shielded him during the tawdriest scandal in presidential history" Taken together, these two claims suggest that the public's willingness to overlook Clinton's scandals and his own public relations work drove his approval. If these claims are true, the existing model must be adjusted. These claims can be restated as the following testable hypotheses. (1) "specific, dramatic, and sharply focused," (2) connected to the president, and (3) the object of extensive media coverage (Mueller 1973: 209, qt. in Simon and Ostrom 1988: 748) .
The events include all those listed in Ostrom and Smith (1992: 182-83 ) and events since then that meet these criteria (please see Appendix A). To account for the Lewinsky affair, all months in 1998 after January are coded as an approval Some studies advocate the monthly change in unemployment rather than the level of unemployment (e.g., Kernell 1978; Beck 1991) , so the models were estimated with this variable and reached the same conclusions. Models with the level of unemployment fit the pre-Clinton period slightly better, so they are included here. (Greene 1993) or "Estimated Generalized Least Squares" (Ostrom 1990 )), the Cochrane-Orcutt and Prais-Winsten estimators, and finally, models with an AR1 and ARMA error process (Beck 1991) .6 All models except the All of this is familiar, established territory, but how well do these models forecast Clinton's approval? Figure 2 presents the lagged dependent variable model's predictions along with the public's actual approval for Clinton's term. All in all, the predictions track closely with actual approval, suggesting that the existing model captures the nature of Clinton's approval ratings better than we might have expected. 
THE MODEL AND CLINTON'S APPROVAL
Despite the seeming anomalies in Clinton's approval, the model predicts and fits the Clinton period surprisingly well. Looking at the effects of the two major elements of the model, the economy and political events, reveals the basic structure of Clinton's approval and how the model explains the Clinton years.
The Economy
Much has been made of the good economic times over which Clinton presided. Figure 3 provides some perspective on just how good economic conditions were, charting the inflation and unemployment rates over the period of study Historically speaking, the overall levels of both inflation and unemployment were quite favorable. Only Eisenhower had a more favorable average inflation rate, while the average unemployment rate over Clinton's term was the lowest since Nixon's tenure. Both indicators were especially favorable prior to and during the Lewinsky investigation. The public appreciated this fact, as 60 percent of a national sample in 1999 said the economy was "the best it had ever been in their lifetime" and approval of Clinton's handling of the economy reached 81 percent, the highest in the question's thirty year history (Andolina and Wilcox 2000: 182) . Taking into account both the level and the estimated effect of the economy on approval reveals the powerful boost the economy provided Clinton's approval during 1998. The overall impact of the economy is best seen by comparing the model's predictions using the actual 1998 economic data with estimates of what approval would have been had the economy not been so strong. The model's predictions using the actual 1998 economic conditions are compared to predictions of approval if Clinton had faced conditions of average inflation and unemployment prior to his term and the economic conditions Nixon faced during the Watergate era. Figure 4 presents these estimates.9 As the figure indicates, Clinton benefited a great deal from the economy during the Lewinsky scandal. The model estimates that his approval would have been 6 points lower on average if he had faced average economic indicators and about 10 points lower if he had headed into impeachment with the economy facing Nixon at the end of his presidency The economic boom Clinton presided over clearly boosted his approval. 9 An iterative process was used to estimate these predictions in the lagged dependent variable setup. In this setup, an increase in inflation or unemployment will lead to a lower predicted approval rating, which will affect next month's approval via the lagged dependent variable. To capture the cumulative effect of different economic conditions, the predicted approval at time t is used as the lagged dependent variable at time t + 1. Essentially, this allows the independent variables to effect approval for several lags into the future. As a check, a model with 12 lags on economic variables was estimated and the cumulative effects of the economy were of roughly the same magnitude and point to the same conclusions. This approach was also used in the next section. That the economy boosted Clinton's approval comes as no surprise, but contrary to many popular explanations of Clinton's approval, the model estimates that the Lewinsky scandal actually did depress Clinton's approval. Table 4 presents the estimated cumulative effect of the Lewinsky scandal on the model's predictions of Clinton's approval. In the first month (February 1998) , the model predicts a drop in approval of 1.22 points because of the scandal. In the second month, because the scandal continued, the model predicts that approval should drop 1.22 points plus the continuing effect of the scandal from the month before, which is the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable multiplied by the initial effect (-1.22 * .852 = -1.04), for a total estimated loss of about 2.26 points. Continuing this process over the course of 1998 generates the cumulative effects listed in Table 4 . As seen there, the scandal actually did hurt Clinton's approval, as the model predicts it cost him up to 7 points, an important loss.
Although the model predicts a drop in approval in response to the scandal, as just noted, it also predicts that the economy would boost approval considerably. Combining the effects demonstrates that the excellent economic conditions, both before and during the scandal, were powerful enough to compensate for the scandal. To get an estimate of the net effects of the economy and the Lewinsky scandal, the fourth column of Figure 5 ).
CONCLUSIONS
The Clinton presidency posed significant challenges to existing research on presidential approval. However 
